考虑安全裕度的多方竞争电网扩展规划方法研究

陈永淑; 洪海生; 唐娴; 周先华; 李荣琳

陈永淑,洪海生,唐娴,周先华,李荣琳.考虑安全裕度的多方竞争电网扩展规划方法研究[J].电测与仪表,2025,62(2):99-106.
Chen Yongshu,Hong Haisheng,Tang Xian,Zhou Xianhua,Li Ronglin.Research on power grid expansion planning method based on multi-party competition considering security margin[J].Electrical Measurement & Instrumentation,2025,62(2):99-106.

考虑安全裕度的多方竞争电网扩展规划方法研究

Research on power grid expansion planning method based on multi-party competition considering security margin

DOI：10.19753/j.issn1001-1390.2025.02.013

中文关键词: 电网规划电力安全多方竞争纳什均衡

英文关键词:power grid planning, power security, multi-party competition, Nash equilibrium

基金项目:中国南方电网有限责任公司科技项目GZHKJXM20200038）

作者中文名	作者英文名	单位
陈永淑	Chen Yongshu	广东电网有限责任公司广州供电局
洪海生	Hong Haisheng	广东电网有限责任公司广州供电局
唐娴	Tang Xian	广东电网有限责任公司广州供电局
周先华	Zhou Xianhua	广东电网有限责任公司广州供电局
李荣琳	Li Ronglin	广东电网有限责任公司广州供电局

摘要点击次数: 290

中文摘要:

电网扩展时往往在多方案下进行，不同方案给电网带来的收益与安全裕度并不一致。因此，提出一种平衡电网安全与投资收益的多方竞争规划方法。建立含多个投资人的电网扩展规划数学模型，采用纳什均衡的概念对电网规划博弈建模为具有平衡约束的平衡问题（equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints, EPEC）。通过一系列线性化，将EPEC建模为混合整数线性规划问题。将能源短缺概率作为安全裕度评估标准，用于建模电网规划博弈中不确定运行参数的风险。通过安全裕度建模，可以得到在不同风险水平下的电网规划博弈的纳什均衡。电网投资博弈的结果可能不同于社会效益最大化基准模式。设计了支持预算机制来激励投资方，使得电网规划博弈的结果尽可能接近社会效益最大化结果。在两种规模的系统上对所提出的方法进行了评估，测试结果表明，所提出的方法可以使非合作博弈的均衡点向社会成本较小的点靠拢，验证了其有效性。

英文摘要:

Power grid expansion is often carried out under multiple scenarios, and the benefits and security margins brought to the power grid by different scenarios are not consistent. Therefore, this paper proposes a multi-party competitive planning method to balance grid security and investment returns. A mathematical model of power grid expansion planning with multiple investors is developed, and the concept of Nash equilibrium is used to model the grid planning game as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC〖KG-*5〗). The EPEC is modeled as a mixed integer linear programming problem through a series of linearization. The energy shortage probability is used as a security margin assessment criterion to model the risk of uncertain operating parameters in the grid planning game. By modeling the security margin, the Nash equilibrium of the grid planning game under different risk levels can be obtained. The results of the grid investment game may differ from the social benefit maximization benchmark model. In addition, a support budget mechanism is designed to incentivize the investors so that the results of the grid planning game are as close as possible to the social benefit maximization results. The proposed approach is evaluated on two scales of systems, and the test results show that the proposed approach can bring the equilibrium point of the non-cooperative game closer to the point with smaller social cost, which verifies its effectiveness.

查看全文查看/发表评论下载PDF阅读器

关闭