基于分时电碳耦合定价的虚拟电厂主从博弈策略研究

段梅梅; 程含渺; 方凯杰; 黄艺璇; 陆思涛; 陈璐

段梅梅,程含渺,方凯杰,黄艺璇,陆思涛,陈璐.基于分时电碳耦合定价的虚拟电厂主从博弈策略研究[J].电测与仪表,2024,61(11):1-11.
Duan Meimei,Cheng Hanmiao,Fang Kaijie,Huang Yixuan,Lu Sitao,Chen Lu.Stackelberg game strategy for virtual power plant considering time-of-use electricity and carbon coupled price[J].Electrical Measurement & Instrumentation,2024,61(11):1-11.

基于分时电碳耦合定价的虚拟电厂主从博弈策略研究

Stackelberg game strategy for virtual power plant considering time-of-use electricity and carbon coupled price

DOI：10.19753/j.issn1001-1390.2024.11.001

中文关键词: 虚拟电厂主从博弈分时电碳定价碳交易需求响应电碳市场

英文关键词:virtual power plant, stackelberg game, time-of-use electricity and carbon coupled pricing, carbon trading, demand response, electric-carbon markets

基金项目:国网江苏国网电力有限公司科技项目(J2023138)

作者中文名	作者英文名	单位
段梅梅	Duan Meimei	国网江苏省电力有限公司营销服务中心;南京邮电大学
程含渺	Cheng Hanmiao	国网江苏省电力有限公司营销服务中心;南京邮电大学
方凯杰	Fang Kaijie	国网江苏省电力有限公司营销服务中心;南京邮电大学
黄艺璇	Huang Yixuan	国网江苏省电力有限公司营销服务中心;南京邮电大学
陆思涛	Lu Sitao	国网江苏省电力有限公司营销服务中心;南京邮电大学
陈璐	Chen Lu	国网江苏省电力有限公司营销服务中心;南京邮电大学

摘要点击次数: 561

中文摘要:

虚拟电厂参与电碳双重市场场景时涉及聚合服务多种用户主体，如何利用价格机制将电碳市场成本合理传递至各类用户主体，并引导其优化运行策略是虚拟电厂运营关键。为此，本文提出了以分时电碳耦合定价为核心的虚拟电厂主从博弈决策模型。首先，从物理和交易维度构建了虚拟电厂运行架构，并设计了基于曲线特征的分时电碳耦合价格模型。然后，以运营商为领导者，各用户主体为追随者，建立了一主多从的虚拟电厂双层博弈模型：上层运营商以最大化自身收益为目标，调整发电设备运行状态并与电碳市场交互，迭代决策分时电碳价格并下发给下层；下层各用户主体以运行成本最小为优化目标，响应上层的分时电碳耦合价格，调整自身运行策略并向上层反馈购能量。算例结果表明，所提模型不仅能优化用户主体购能策略和提高运营商收益，也为碳市场费用合理分摊提供了一种有效途径。

英文摘要:

When virtual power plants participate in the dual electricity and carbon market, they involve aggregating services for multiple user entities. The key to operating a virtual power plant lies in how to utilize pricing mechanisms to reasonably pass on the costs of the electricity and carbon markets to various user entities and guide them to optimize their operational strategies. To this end, this paper proposes a virtual power plant stackelberg game decision model with time-sharing electricity-carbon coupling pricing as its core. Firstly, the operational architecture of the VPP is constructed from physical and transactional dimensions, and a time-of-use electricity and carbon coupling price model based on curve characteristics is designed. Then, with the VPP operator as the leader and various user subjects as followers, a one-leader-multi-follower two-level Stackelberg game model for VPP is established. In the upper level, the VPP operator aims to maximize its own revenue by adjusting the operating status of power generation equipment and interacting with the electricity and carbon market, iteratively deciding on time-of-use electricity and carbon coupled prices, and sending them to the lower level. In the lower level, each user entity aims to minimize its operating costs by responding to the time-of-use electricity and carbon prices from the upper level, adjusting its own operating strategy, and providing feedback on energy purchases to the upper level. The results of numerical examples show that the proposed model can not only optimize the energy purchase strategies of user entities and improve the revenue of VPP operator but also provide an effective way for the reasonable allocation of carbon market costs.

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