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文章摘要
基于博弈论的智能电网与需求侧交互管理策略
Game theory based interactive demand side management responding to dynamic pricing in price-based demand response of smart grids
Received:November 05, 2020  Revised:November 16, 2020
DOI:10.19753/j.issn1001-1390.2022.07.018
中文关键词: 智能电网  需求管理  Stackelberg博弈  需求基线预测
英文关键词: Smart grid  demand management  Stackelberg game  demand baseline forecast
基金项目:国家重点研发计划项目(2017YFB0902600)
Author NameAffiliationE-mail
ZHU Bin* China State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co., Ltd, yaoandoutong360@yeah.net 
WANG Yifan China State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co., Ltd, yaoandoutong360@yeah.net 
SUN Gang China State Grid Zhejiang Electric Power Co., Ltd, yaoandoutong360@yeah.net 
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中文摘要:
      针对在智能电网与需求侧进行双向交互时,电网与需求侧的效益难以同时兼顾的问题,本文提出了一种基于博弈论的智能电网与需求侧交互管理策略。该策略利用斯塔克伯格(Stackelberg)博弈使电网与需求侧之间的对抗策略始终处于纳什均衡状态,从而确保双方的利益最大化。此外,本文还研究了需求基线预测不准确对交互策略的影响,并提出了增强型交互策略来应对这种不确定性。最后本文以香港理工大学微电网为例进行仿真分析,验证了该策略的有效性。结果表明,所提策略可使电网的净利润增加8%,需求波动降低40%左右,需求侧节约电费2.5–8.3%左右。此外,增强型交互策略可有效地缓解需求基线预测不准确时带来的负面影响。
英文摘要:
      Aiming at the problem of the two-way interaction between the smart grid and the demand side, the benefits of the grid and the demand side are difficult to take into account at the same time, this paper proposes a strategy for interactive management of the smart grid and the demand side based on game theory. This strategy uses the Stackelberg game to keep the confrontation strategy between the grid and the demand side always in a Nash equilibrium state, thereby ensuring that the interests of both parties are maximized. In addition, this paper also studies the impact of demand baseline forecasting on interactive strategies, and proposes enhanced interactive strategies to deal with this uncertainty. Finally, this paper takes the Hong Kong Polytechnic University as an example for simulation analysis to verify the effectiveness of the strategy. The results show that the proposed strategy can increase the net profit of the power grid by 8%, reduce the fluctuation of demand by about 40%, and save electricity costs by 2.5-8.3% on the demand side. In addition, the enhanced interaction strategy can also effectively mitigate the negative impact caused by inaccurate baseline demand forecasting.
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