When virtual power plants participate in the dual electricity and carbon market, they involve aggregating services for multiple user entities. The key to operating a virtual power plant lies in how to utilize pricing mechanisms to reasonably pass on the costs of the electricity and carbon markets to various user entities and guide them to optimize their operational strategies. To this end, this paper proposes a virtual power plant stackelberg game decision model with time-sharing electricity-carbon coupling pricing as its core. Firstly, the operational architecture of the VPP is constructed from physical and transactional dimensions, and a time-of-use electricity and carbon coupling price model based on curve characteristics is designed. Then, with the VPP operator as the leader and various user subjects as followers, a one-leader-multi-follower two-level Stackelberg game model for VPP is established. In the upper level, the VPP operator aims to maximize its own revenue by adjusting the operating status of power generation equipment and interacting with the electricity and carbon market, iteratively deciding on time-of-use electricity and carbon coupled prices, and sending them to the lower level. In the lower level, each user entity aims to minimize its operating costs by responding to the time-of-use electricity and carbon prices from the upper level, adjusting its own operating strategy, and providing feedback on energy purchases to the upper level. The results of numerical examples show that the proposed model can not only optimize the energy purchase strategies of user entities and improve the revenue of VPP operator but also provide an effective way for the reasonable allocation of carbon market costs.